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University of Technology, Sydney 
The purpose of this paper is to outline some methodological implications for a new 
theory of workplace learning proposed by Hager and Halliday (2002). who set out a 
relationship between context, judgement and learning. Learning is seen as concerned 
with judgements that are potentially fallible but also contextually sensitive. This 
approach was based on philosophical foundations and was not intended to provide a 
testable model, however. it has direct implications for the ways in which we structure 
learning situations (e.g .. whether and how learners are able to combine discrete 
. pieces of information). This paper sets out their approach as a Perceptual-
, Judgemental-Reinforcement approach to adult learning and outlines a specific 
research methodology for investigating the clai11! that judgements are based on 
implicit and explicit factors. The methodology is based upon social judgement theory 
and multiple-cue probability learning for examining the context of judgement. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline some implications of a new theory of 
workplace learning proposed by Hager and Halliday (2002), who set out a relationship 
between context, judgement and learning. They saw learning as concerned with 
judgements that are potentially fallible but also contextually sensitive (Halliday & 
Hager, 2002). The Hager-Halliday approach was based on philosophical foundations 
and was not intended to provide a testable model. In this paper an attempt is made to 
translate their conceptions into a testable Perceptual-Judgemental-Reinforcement 
model (see Figure 1 for my representation of their ideas) and the following sections of 
this paper focus only upon the contextual or perceptual part of the workplace learning 
process. 
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Figure 1: The Hager-Halliday approach expressed as a Perceptual-Judgemental-
Reinforcement model ofleaming (note that the model is recursive) 
Hager and Halliday (2002) argued that judgement is central to learning and that 
interests, purposes as well as features of a situation affect the judgement processes. 
The starting point for their model is the relationship between factors in a situation and 
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jUdgements. A precursor for this perspective is the intellectual work 'Life, Work and 
Learning. Practice in post-modernity' by Beckett and Hager (2002). This traced the 
Inks between workplace learning and practical judgements and it was argued that: 
, .. . all workers - and indeed all adults in their lives in general, both now and 
for the foreseeable future - as subjects of learning potential are best regarded 
as integrated thinking and doing beings who exercise all manner of judgement 
during the working day - these are their practices' (p. 40). 
Towards the end of their book, they described six aspects of practical jUdgement that 
will be referred to in subsequent discussion of studies relevant to this topic: 
'1. Judgements are holistic 
2. Judgements are contextual 
3. Judgements denote 
4. Judgements are defeasible 
5. Judgements include problem identification 
6. Judgements are socially shaped' (p. 185). 
The holistic aspect refers to the integration and existence of intermeditate judgements. 
The contextual description is linked to the combination of information and the fact 
that judgements reflect changes in the environment. The criterion that judgements 
denote relates to the fact that judgements have consequences and affect the world 
around us. Beckett and Hager (2002) noted that judgements may be modified or 
require change and are therefore defeasible. Finally they referred to judgements in 
terms of them involving problem identification and often being collaborative or 
collegial in nature and hence socially-shaped. Of course, these are descriptions that 
can be applied to judgements but do not refer to the specifics of the antecedent 
circumstances. 
A key aspect of the approach outlined by Halliday and Hager (2002) is that 
judgements remain contextually sensitive to implicit and explicit features of a 
situation. They laid out a general plan and at that time did not seek to specifY how 
these features interacted. They indicated, however, that the judgements are based on 
personally relevant features of a situation. In this respect the model has major 
similarities to the field of research instigated by Brunswik on the importance of 
perception and judgement for all human responding (Hammond, 1996). The 
remainder of this paper deals with the social judgement analysis and outlines some 
relevant experimental findings that support the contextual aspects of a Perceptual-
Judgemental-Reinforcement model ofworkplace learning. 
Social Judgement AnalYSis 
As far back as the early 1950s, Brunswik (1956) posited that an object in the 
environment (i.e., a distal stimulus) stimulated a person's sensory organs to produce 
multiple cues (i.e., a proximal stimulus) to the object's identity and properties. 
Researchers like Brunswik, acknowledged perceptions to be a construction from an 
incomplete and fallible collection of sensory cues. They pointed out that human 
judgment is analogous to perception. 
Brunswik and his successors outlined a methodology for decomposing the 
contribution of specific factors in judgements that are made under conditions of 
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complexity and uncertainty (see Cooksey, 1996). Individuals will differ in their ways 
of judgement and it is hypothesised this may depend upon the cues or factors in a 
situation. Figure 2 describes the classic double lens model design as Brunswik 
conceptualised it. This double system design explicitly compares judgments with 
values for ecological criterion measures and sets the stage for research on how people 
learn about the use of cues in the ecology and research into judgmental accuracy and 
learning. 
Cues, scenarios, infannatian 
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Figure 2: Double lens model for studying judgments 
While the representation in Figure 2 may appear daunting at first glance, it is 
essentially quite simple. It represents a person making a judgement or learning about 
a situation from information that has been presented to himlher. In Figure 2 the Y s 
represents the person's judgments; and the X\-Xn represent the value of cues, 
information or details in the situations that are presented to a person. If the person is 
presented with multiple instances then it is possible to decompose their judgement and 
determine how the aspects in a situation (Xt-Xn) are influencing their judgements. 
Furthermore, if we already know in advance the criterion value for the judgement in 
each situation (i.e., the learning criterion, the optimal response or the correct answer) 
then it is possible to calculate the relationship between those same aspects in all the 
situations that we presented to a person and the criterion responses. We can then fit 
regression equations to both sides of the process to judgements and to the criterion. 
The predicted judgement is derived from a regression equation fitted to the cues in a 
situation and the criterion in the ecology. Using the double lens model it is then 
possible to formulate an important identity (see Figure 3). 
The importance of this identity is that it enables us to determine the components of 
achievement. The lens model was not formulated for educational . or workplace 
learning issues but the notion of achievement has direct relevance and implications for 
situational theories of learning and cognitive apprenticeship. It offers the opportunity 
for quantification in an area that has largely been descriptive and anecdotal. 
3 
where: 
r. = the achievement index (i.e., the correlation between a judgement and the criterion) 
R. = the predictability index (i.e., the multiple correlation of the cues or factors in a situation with 
the criterion). 
R. = cognitive control (i.e., the multiple correlation of the cues or factors in the situation with the 
judgement for all scenarios) 
G = a knowledge index (Le., the correlation between the prediction and the predicted judgments for 
aU scenarios) 
C = an unmodeled knowledge (i.e., the correlation between the residuals from the above 
predictions) . 
Figure 3: Components of Achievement 
If the Halliday and Hager (2002) proposal is correct then people will repond to both 
implicit and explicit features of the situation in lawful but idiosyncratic ways. This 
should be the case where individuals are exposed to situations in which there is a 
single, identifiably correct solution or everyday situations where th~re is a 
subjectively preferred or personally optimal answer. Their hypothesis lepds itself to a 
focus upon intensive quantitative investigation of a few individuals (e.g., Athanasou 
& Cooksey, 200l). The benefits of intensive case studies of responses to large 
numbers of real situations lie in the representative design and ecological validity of 
the findings. This idiographic approach (rather than nomothetic) leads to the 
accumulation of observations and enables us to detennine what features of the context 
are likely to be relevant to the future interests of a learner (Athanasou, 1998, 1999). 
A number of studies within the context of multiple-cue probability learning have 
pursued such a focus. The final section of this paper deals with these studies in some 
detail. The reader who is not interested in these specific details may skip this section. 
Table 1: Results from multiple-cue probability learning studies relevant to the Hager-
H n'd h th· a 1 ay ypo eSIS 
INVESTIGATORS JUDGEMENT KEY FINDINGS2 
ASPECTS1 
Summers (1962) Contextual Cue utilisation was proportional to validity 
Bjorkman (1965) Contextual Learning occurs more rapidly when categories are 
homogeneous 
Transfer is facilitated after training on heterogeneous 
categories 
Learning occurs without reinforcement by observation 
Newton (1965) Denote Outcome feedback containing ecological validities led to 
si~ficantly improved achievement 
Todd & Hammond Denote Information which allowed a person to compare their 
(1965) dependency on cues with their ecological validities was of 
greater value than knowledge of accuracy 
Azuma & Cronbach Holistic Concept formation isolated a sub-universes and identified a 
(1966) rule applying within the sub-universe 
Concept formation merged sub-universes and applied a 
single parsimonious rule 
Dudycha & Naylor Contextual Pairing an additional cue to one onow validity was always 
(1966) facilitating, while adding an additional cue to one of high 
validity was always detrimental 
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Sununers & Contextual Task properties and task information determine inferential 
Hammond (1966) accuracy and cue dependence 
Bauer (1972) Contextual General tendency to choose the more frequent cue 
mespective of cue validity 
Deane, Hammond & Holistic Performance on tasks requiring complex nonlinear 
Sununers (1972) relations can be partitioned into acquisition and application 
of task knowledge; poor performance can be attributed to 
incomplete cognitive control rather than incomplete 
knowledge 
Castellan (1973) Contextual The number of irrelevant cues had an effect on 
performance that diminished but did not disappear across 
trials; and there was an interaction between the number of 
irrelevant cues and the validity of the relevant cue, the 
resultant performance decrement being greatest for cues of 
moderate validity 
Steinmann (1974) Denote, Compared with outcome feedback both feedforward and 
defeasible lens model feedback led to increases in the consistency and 
knowledge components of accuracy 
Annelius & Denote, When people received no feedback confidence was 
Annelius defeasible determined by the cue intercorrelation; when people 
received feedback the effects of the cue intercorrelation on 
confidence was reduced 
-
" Jugement aspects are denved from Beckett & Hager (2002, p. 185) 
'Findings are quoted directly from Holzman (1999) 
Multiple-Cue Probability Learning Studies 
Brunswik and Henna (1951) conducted the first study of cue probability learning 
using a relationship between position and the estimated weight of an obj ect. These 
studies involved the presentation of cues or infonnation from which a judgement 
could subsequently be made. The accuracy of the judgement can be compared with 
the criterion or true result. In such experiments various aspects of the situation have 
come to be studied including, the nature of the cues, their relevance, their redundancy 
or extent of intercorrelation, their validity and the type of feedback or outcome 
infonnation provided to judges. This has provided a large body of literature, some of 
which is relevant for the perceptual-judgemental-reinforcement model of adult 
learning. The results from a range of studies that are relevant to the subject of this 
paper are summarised in Table 1. These are taken from an unpublished Annotated 
Bibliography of Cue Probability Learning Studies by R. J. Holzworth (1999). 
Implications 
These studies show that much of our human judgement and learning is quasi-rational 
and based on perceived relationships. It ranges along a continuum from intuitive to 
analytic. The findings of earlier studies linked perceptions with learning and support 
the general framework of the Hager-Halliday hypothesis but the relations are probably 
more complex than those envisaged by Beckett and Hager (2002). It seems unlikely 
that isolated case studies of judgements (no matter how real or descriptive) will 
provide a substantial and accumulated base of theoretical knowledge of judgement 
and decision making in the context of adult learning. 
The selected multiple-cue probability learning studies that were reviewed showed 
inter alia that the use of cues was dependent on the relevance or validity of the 
infonnation provided. Learning was easier when the information provided was 
clustered in some way and that this facilitated transfer. A consistent finding was that 
feedback on the accuracy of judgements may not be as important as first imagined by 
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many laypersons. It may be more helpful to provide information about the nature of 
the decision-making ecology within which judgements are being made. 
Most of the six judgement aspects described by Beckett and Hager (2002) have been 
covered in the cue probability learning studies. The astute reader would have noticed 
that the problem identification and socially shaped aspects were not mentioned. This 
is due to the limited number of studies using adults or the limited applications in work 
settings as well as my selection of examples that focused on theoretical rather than 
applied studies. Problem identification and socially shaped aspects tend to feature in 
the applications of cue-probability learning. For example, medical diagnosis was 
investigated by Tape, Kripal and Wigton (I992) who studied the role of feedback in 
the prediction of cardiovascular disease. 
The Halliday-Hager hypothesis considered that both implicit and explicit factors 
influence perceptions and judgement. The multiple-cue probability learning studies 
that were reviewed, however, did not make this distinction and this appears to be 
fruitful field for future research. The implicit and explicit factors might be considered 
as SUb-universes of information to which separate judgement heuristics are applied 
initially. Decisions about the sub-universes might be gradually merged using a more 
parsimonious judgement heuristic. Subsequently there may be a need to consider 
separately the stages of knowledge and application. That is, conscious awareness or 
theoretical knowledge may not be translated readily into real-world problem solving 
and application. 
Judgements also reflect our use of specific cues or criteria and it has been shown that 
there is a great deal of individuality in this process. This is especially the case when 
judgements are made under conditions of uncertainty and where there are probabilities 
involved. We have known for some time that experience does not necessarily 
improve people's judgements because biases prevent people from using the 
information offered by experience (see Brehmer, 1980). For instance, Brehmer 
reported that these biases include (a) the use of confirmatory evidence; assumptions 
about causality; and (c) disregard of negative information. Faced with such 
lawfulness in individual behaviour and the incongruities 0 decision making under 
conditions of complexity then the only way ahead may be to consider a program of 
research that documents the idiosyncrasies of each person's judgements and learning 
in different contexts and under varying conditions. 
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